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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice1 intelligently addresses 
difficult issues at the intersection of medical ethics and the theory of 
justice.  The authors Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, 
and Daniel Wikler repeatedly emphasized their opinion that advances in 
genetic technology force upon us entirely new ethical questions that 
previous moral theories lack the resources to resolve.2  The claim that 
 
 *  Professor, University of California San Diego. 
 1. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 
(2000). 
 2. The authors pointed to “another set of distributive justice issues raised by rapid 
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new scientific discoveries render previous moral theories obsolete 
should be regarded with suspicion.  Suspicion should be further aroused 
when readers note another feature of the authors’ theorizing that neatly 
fits the claim that we stand at the dawn of a new world of ethical 
theorizing.  The authors’ discussion from start to finish stayed at a 
middle level.  That is, the authors began each chapter with a few moral 
principles taken to be plausible or possibly plausible and examined their 
implications for issues raised by new genetic technology.3  This is not an 
exercise in applied ethics, because the principles initially invoked are 
subjected to criticism and scrutiny.  But in almost every significant case, 
the results are inconclusive.  The moral puzzles that are raised are left 
unsolved, with moral reasons pointing towards opposed conclusions and 
the principles that generated these opposed reasons left in an unordered 
state, with no guidance as to how much relative weight to assign to one 
or another of these principles.  The authors endorsed Rawlsian reflective 
equilibrium methodology4 in ethics, but tentative reflective equilibrium5 
tends to remain beyond reach in the chapters of this book. 
These results might be thought to justify the conclusion that the 
problems we now face require new age theories not yet constructed.  
 
advances in genetic science that have not even been systematically articulated, much less 
resolved.”  Id. at 62–63.  The authors also stated that “as the possibilities of what may be 
called radical genetic intervention come closer to realization, the most fundamental 
single framing assumption of our ordinary ways of thinking about justice, both in theory 
and in practice, will be shattered.”  Id. at 84–85. 
 3. For example, chapters 3 and 4 discuss interpretations of equality of opportunity 
in the light of genetic advances.  Id. at 61–154.  Chapter 5 discusses possible moral 
limits on would-be parents’ freedom to use genetic science interventions to enhance their 
children’s traits that are posed by equality of opportunity and the child’s right to an open 
future.  Id. at 156–203.  Chapter 6 discusses how properly to balance reproductive 
freedom and the duty not to cause harm to those who do not voluntarily consent to bear 
the risks and costs of one’s actions.  Id. at 204–57.  Summarizing their approach, the 
authors stated that they did not “offer a comprehensive theory,” but instead deployed 
several “broad principles” including equality of opportunity, the prevention of harm, 
individual freedom, citizenship and political participation, and inclusion in society.  Id. at 
308–09. 
 4. The authors noted that they employed the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium.  Id. at 371.  The method is drawn from John Rawls.  JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 40–46 (rev. ed. 1999).  Using this method, one tests proposed 
particular moral claims by seeking to identify acceptable moral principles that imply 
them, and one tests proposed moral principles by checking to see if the particular moral 
claims they would imply are acceptable.  In reflective equilibrium, one embraces general 
moral principles and particular moral claims that are mutually consistent and that strike 
one as plausible after reflection.  Wide reflective equilibrium is that state of reflective 
equilibrium one would reach after ideally extended and rationally conducted moral 
reflection. 
 5. As used in this Essay, a tentative or provisional reflective equilibrium means to 
refer to the outcome of an ethical discussion in which all considerations presented are 
accounted for and all particular moral claims defended are implied by moral principles 
that the discussion has found no good reason to reject. 
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However, this conclusion would be premature.  Another possibility is 
that when middle level theorizing yields no decisive results, we need to 
shift the discussion back to first principles.  Issues that appear intractable 
when viewed through unordered midlevel principles may be resolvable 
when we step back to the level of fundamental moral principles. 
One should also notice the possibility that quite independently of 
scenarios suggested by the development of new genetic technologies, our 
current understanding of morality at the fundamental level is quite shaky.  
Different kinds of problems pull our intuitions in different directions, 
and no set of moral principles currently available provides a stable and 
intuitively acceptable reconciliation of these conflicting ethical tugs and 
pulls.  If this is our actual situation, then a finding that current ethical 
theory cannot resolve in a satisfactory way some problem brought up by 
new genetic technologies should not lead us to the trumpet call that we 
are witnessing the dawn of a revolutionary new age.  What we are 
witnessing is business as usual. 
This Essay argues that From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice 
exhibits both of the possible flaws just mentioned.  In some cases the 
authors discussed midlevel principles and took the inability of these 
principles to resolve some problem in medical ethics as evidence that 
the problem is, for now, intractable.  However, if one looks for a more 
fundamental level principle adequate to resolve this impasse, one is 
ready at hand, and its deftness in rendering the tractable intractable 
provides evidence that this candidate fundamental level principle 
deserves to be taken seriously.  In other cases the authors presented new 
genetic technologies as posing entirely new puzzles that current theories 
are inadequate to resolve.  Upon examination, however, it turns out that 
the new problems, though genuinely perplexing for current theory, are 
versions of problems that have always been with us and have always 
been perplexing.  In one case, while discussing equality of opportunity, 
the authors upheld a principle that I shall argue is plagued with 
difficulties that warrant its rejection.6 
 
 6. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.  One should note that the authors stated 
in the preface that they disagree among themselves to some extent “regarding some 
aspects of the theory of just health care and the place of equality of opportunity in a 
comprehensive theory of justice.”  Id. at xiii–xiv.  They pointed out that Allen Buchanan 
was the primary author of chapters 3 and 7 while Norman Daniels authored chapter 4.  Id. 
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II.  DO GENETIC TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES REQUIRE RETHINKING 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE? 
A notable attractive feature of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and 
Justice is its extended discussion of the implications for the theory of 
justice of puzzle cases suggested by advances in genetic technology.  
These discussions proceed at an admirable level of clarity and rigor.  
However, I discern a tendency to exaggerate the extent to which the 
puzzles suggested by these medical advances really require rewriting the 
book on social justice. 
The authors asserted that several contemporary theories of distributive 
justice start their discussions by postulating a world of individuals 
differing in native talents, and, more generally, in native dispositions to 
develop prudentially desirable and undesirable traits.7  The individuals 
also differ in childhood social environments that they experience.  In 
these discussions a set of institutions and practices is implicitly 
presupposed, so that individuals as described face unequal life prospects 
at the onset of adulthood.  The question for social justice then becomes 
what compensation, if any, is morally required to improve the life 
prospects of worse-off individuals.  The authors then stated that this 
framework comes unhinged if we add the possibility that medical 
interventions after birth can alter an individual’s genes and hence her 
tendency to develop certain traits.8  Rather than compensate individuals 
for lack of natural talent, one perhaps should intervene to alter genes and 
equalize talents across individuals.  The expanded possibilities for 
interventions to improve individuals’ traits that genetic science advances 
might bring would expand the requirements of some egalitarian 
conceptions of distributive justice in radical and perhaps disturbing 
ways. 
But why would the possibility of administering gene therapy with a 
view to altering someone’s traits to improve her life prospects differ in 
principle from the familiar possibility of administering an education 
regime or a socialization regime with a view to altering someone’s 
traits to improve her life prospects?  A society might intervene to make 
an individual’s social environment more conducive to individual 
development, boosting the individual’s life prospects.  This might occur 
by way of instituting public health programs such as vaccination, 
maintaining state-run public schools free to students, establishing public 
playgrounds, and monitoring parents and guardians to enforce a 
 
 7. Id. at 76. 
 8. Id. at 76–79. 
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sufficient level of parental nurturing and prevention of child abuse.  
Providing genetic therapy would be just one more tool in society’s tool 
kit to be deployed to improve individuals’ life prospects according to 
principles of distributive justice. 
The authors noted another possibility, one that has to some extent 
already become actual.9  In a world in which genetic testing of fetuses 
becomes more sophisticated, potential parents can decide whether to 
bring to term a fetus that is diagnosed as having a condition deemed 
undesirable.  One can envisage the development of medical technologies 
that enable intervention before or after conception to affect the genetic 
qualities of what will become new persons.  The social justice issues 
then become, one might think, utterly transformed, from what we owe to 
given people to improve their life prospects to what sort of people 
should we bring into being.10  But of course the new issue is familiar in 
broad outline.  It has been common knowledge for a very long time that 
if a smart person marries another smart person, the two are more likely 
to give birth to a smart child than would have been the case had the 
smart person married the village idiot.  Assortative mating raises the 
moral issue of what sort of people we should bring into being.  But I 
acknowledge that increasing genetic knowledge renders salient certain 
extreme possibilities that can put strain on existing distributive justice 
categories, much as the development of nuclear weapons might be 
thought to pose a new challenge for traditional just war theory.  This is 
not to deny that increasing scientific knowledge could radically 
undermine the basis of a moral theory—in fact, modern science 
decisively threatens traditional and deep-seated notions of agency and 
responsibility and free will.11  However, the genetic technology 
scenarios presented by the authors do not remotely correspond to this 
deep conceptual paradox production. 
III.  TOWARD PLAUSIBLE CANDIDATE FUNDAMENTAL                           
MORAL PRINCIPLES 
In chapters 3 and 4, the authors addressed difficult issues of 
distributive justice as they emerge in the context of health care policy 
 
 9. Id. at 2–3. 
 10. Id. at 84–86; see also id. at 204–57. 
 11. For a fine recent treatment of this topic, see DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING 
WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001). 
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issues.12  Before considering their discussion of these matters, this Essay 
sketches an approach to social justice that is plausible and may be 
worthy of further examination. 
Perhaps the most fundamental idea in this package is found in 
Amartya Sen’s writings on social justice.13  Sen noted that people’s 
individual characteristics vary, so that different individuals are unequally 
able to transform resources into goal fulfillment or well-being for 
themselves and others.14 
If the imperative of social justice is to help enable people who are 
disadvantaged to lead better lives, then the basis of interpersonal 
comparison for the theory of justice should be the quality of life that 
given resources in a particular environment enable an individual to 
reach.  One’s resource or primary social goods holdings can only be a 
rough indicator, not the ultimate social justice concern.  Here, the term 
“quality of life” refers to the individual’s objective level of well-being, 
not her preference satisfaction level or happiness.  We all want to 
achieve lives of value, not merely to satisfy our preferences, which 
might be confused or otherwise misdirected.  Happiness, the experience 
of pleasure, or more broadly, a subjective sense of well-being, is a 
component of the good life, not the whole of it.  In short, the currency of 
justice should be well-being.15 
The authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice asserted 
a claim that could reasonably be regarded as a significant objection 
against taking well-being to be the basis of interpersonal comparison for 
the theory of justice: citizens in modern democracies disagree about 
what constitutes human good.16  The wide diversity of religious belief in 
democratic societies indicates the depth and breadth of this 
disagreement.  The claim that is supposed to follow is that some version 
of a resource-oriented theory of justice must be correct, because no 
welfarist alternative could elicit the reasoned agreement of all citizens. 
However, this thought eliminates objective well-being as the basis of 
interpersonal comparison for justice purposes only by invoking a 
skepticism about prospects of reasoned ethical agreement that would 
 
 12. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 61–155. 
 13. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992) (explicating the complex 
notion of equality of condition and explaining its place in theories of justice). 
 14. Id. at 19–21, 79–87. 
 15. Sen himself is cautious about drawing the inference his arguments may 
warrant, that the currency of justice (the standard of interpersonal comparison employed 
in fundamental social justice principles) should be an objective standard of utility or 
well-being.  For a discussion of this issue, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 29–54 (1999).  See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 11–115 (2000). 
 16. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 80–81. 
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shrivel the theory of justice if it were applied evenhandedly across the 
concepts of the good and the right. 
Setting aside such skepticism, reflective equilibrium methods in ethics 
can generate stable agreement regarding both the good and the right.  
Much actual disagreement about the good is rooted in ignorance, 
confusion, superstition, and bad reasoning. But a just society that 
provides people fair shares of opportunity to lead genuinely good lives is 
not somehow rendered unjust or morally illegitimate by the fact that 
some citizens regard themselves as unfairly treated or having 
inadequate opportunity for the good because they have incorrect 
beliefs about the nature of human good.  One should also be prepared 
to accept partial commensurability—some goods and ways of life may 
be indeterminately choice worthy, neither better nor worse than each 
other nor exactly as good as each other. 
What constitute fair shares of opportunity for well-being?  Some 
propose a norm of equal distribution.17  The approach favored in this 
Essay does not regard everyone’s having the same as morally valuable, 
much less that it is a requirement of justice for everyone to have the 
same.  The imperative of morality, and of justice as the social arm of 
morality, is to bring about improvement in the quality of people’s lives, 
with priority given to boosting the well-being of those whose prospects 
for well-being would otherwise be poor. 
This is the doctrine known as the priority view or prioritarianism.18 It 
says that acts and policies should be chosen to maximize moral value, 
this being a function of well-being and its distribution.19  The moral 
value of obtaining a well-being gain (avoiding a loss) for an individual is 
greater, the greater the well-being gain the benefit achieves, and greater, 
the lower the person’s lifetime well-being expectation before receipt of 
the benefit.  This characterization identifies a family of principles; a 
 
 17. For a defense of equality of condition, see LARRY TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993).  
Temkin also defends equality against priority.  Id. at 245–82. 
 18. For the first published discussions on the priority view, see Paul Weirich, 
Utility Tempered with Equality, 17 NOÛS 423 (1983); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE 
REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 31 (rev. ed. 1994).  For a thorough exposition, see 
DEREK PARFIT, EQUALITY OR PRIORITY? (1995).  See also Dennis McKerlie, Equality and 
Priority, 6 UTILITAS 25 (1994).   
 19. More generally, the prioritarian holds that it is more valuable to bring about a 
benefit (or avoid a loss) for someone the worse their condition.  This Essay ties the 
priority view to a particular claim about how to assess someone’s condition as better or 
worse.  Well-being refers to whatever makes a person’s life intrinsically better for that 
very person. 
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specific principle is obtained by specifying how much extra moral value 
accrues from provision of gains to the badly off. 
Prioritarianism as so far characterized is well defined only for decision 
problems in which the number of individuals who will exist can be 
regarded as fixed.  This Essay will not try to formulate a version of the 
principle for variable population.20 
The question arises whether what we owe to an individual by way of 
boosts to her well-being varies depending on her exercise of 
responsibility. This might be done by stipulating that what we owe to 
one another is the provision of prioritarian shares of opportunity for 
well-being rather than any guarantee of any level of well-being itself.  It 
might be done in other ways.  I favor responsibility-catering versions of 
prioritarianism, but this Essay, for the most part, ignores this issue.21  
This Essay alternates between formulating prioritarianism as requiring 
provision of opportunities for well-being and as requiring provision of 
well-being. 
IV.  THE MORALITY OF INCLUSION: PUZZLES AND A SOLUTION 
The authors posed as an unsolved puzzle for morality the issue of 
inclusion of disabled people into schemes of cooperation.22  They began 
with the observation, first made by Daniel Wikler in 1979, that whether 
an individual with given traits qualifies as able in the normal way or 
disabled depends on the matching between the individual’s traits and the 
 
 20. One promising proposed principle that fixes what should be done when 
population is variable is critical-level utilitarianism.  This view holds that adding a 
person to the world is not per se morally valuable unless the person has lifetime utility 
(well-being) above some critical level.  The critical-level idea can be joined to the 
priority view.  See generally Charles Blackorby et al., Critical-Level Utilitarianism and 
the Population-Ethics Dilemma, 13 ECON. & PHIL. 197 (1997). 
 21. For more on this issue, see Richard J. Arneson, Rawls, Responsibility, and 
Distributive Justice, in JUSTICE, UTILITY, AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM: THEMES FROM 
HARSANYI AND RAWLS (Maurice Salles & John Weymark eds., forthcoming) (arguing 
that integrating a sensible account of personal responsibility into the theory of justice 
requires rejecting Rawls’s views).  See also Richard J. Arneson, Egalitarianism and 
Responsibility, 3 J. ETHICS 225 (1999) (urging that plausible judgments about when and 
why we should aid those who are worse off are better explained and justified by the 
priority view than by rival principles of equality or sufficiency); Richard J. Arneson, 
Equal Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 488 (1999) 
(arguing that principles of justice should be prioritarian not egalitarian, responsibility 
catering, and welfarist); Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, 
110 ETHICS 339 (2000) (arguing that personal responsibility as reflected in the 
distinction between brute luck and option luck should be incorporated in fundamental 
moral principles, which should be prioritarian); Richard J. Arneson, Welfare Should Be 
the Currency of Justice, 30 CAN. J. PHIL. 497 (2000) (arguing that the measure of 
people’s condition for the theory of distributive justice should be well-being objectively 
understood). 
 22. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 20–21, 95–99, 258–303. 
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going schemes of cooperation.23  They added that the set-up of these 
cooperative schemes is a human contrivance and one that can be altered 
by deliberate policy.24  The issue then becomes what limits justice places 
on the morally permissible constitution of cooperative schemes, given 
that any choice of scheme includes some and perhaps excludes some.  
The authors focussed on the latent or explicit choice of a dominant 
scheme of social cooperation, set by the entry requirements for full 
participation in the market economy and the governmental process and 
the educational system and similar large institutional schemes.25 
The authors set up the issue nicely but left it unresolved.  One is left 
with conflicting considerations pulling in opposite directions, with no 
guideline for reconciling them.  On the one side, people with diminished 
capacities have a legitimate interest in being able to participate fully in 
the dominant scheme of social cooperation, which would assure them a 
status of basic equality and reciprocity.  Justice inclines toward the 
imperative of revising and opening the dominant scheme of social 
cooperation to render it ever more inclusive of as many marginal 
participants as possible.  But justice is pulled from the other side as well.  
The countervailing tug is what the authors called the “maximizing 
interest” and explained in these words: “Each individual has an 
important and morally legitimate interest in having access to a 
cooperative scheme that is the most productive and rewarding form of 
interaction in which he or she can participate effectively.”26  Beyond 
emphasizing the significant justice reasons that urge us to give full 
measure to the claims of the morality of inclusion, the authors did not 
offer a proposal for balancing the conflicting considerations that they 
adduced.27 
The authors did claim that identifying the problem of the morality of 
inclusion is itself a novel achievement.  Of the conflict between the 
interest in widening access to the dominant cooperative scheme and in 
making that scheme maximally productive, they wrote: “Theorists of 
 
 23. Id. at 285–86; Daniel Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 377, 386–89 (1979). 
 24. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 284–87. 
 25. Id. at 20, 258–60, 288–91. 
 26. Id. at 291–92. 
 27. But see the authors’ interesting discussion.  Id. at 301–02.  Here the authors 
tentatively suggested that there might be a strong moral requirement, as a first priority, to 
bring as many individuals as possible to a threshold level of participation that is good 
enough.  Id.  Beyond that threshold, the maximizing interest has more weight. 
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justice have not only failed to supply a principled account of how these 
conflicting interests ought to be balanced; they have almost without 
exception failed to identify the problem as one of justice.”28  Benighted 
theorists of justice have assumed the problem of justice to be a fair 
division of the benefits of social cooperation.  But the prior and more 
fundamental problem, identified by the authors, is the choice of a 
framework of social cooperation. 
However, the problem as characterized by the authors is not new, and 
there are already available theories of justice that address it. 
A.  Not New 
All human societies have contained disabled and partially disabled 
individuals, more generally individuals with varying abilities.  Any 
theory of justice that supposes that better-off individuals have some 
moral obligation founded on justice to aid worse-off individuals will 
generate an account of what is owed to the disabled, so long as the 
theory countenances disability as a form or component of being worse 
off.  The account of what is owed to the disabled will fall out from the 
account of what is owed to those who are badly off, disadvantaged.  One 
might get a contrary impression from reading John Rawls’s famous A 
Theory of Justice, but Rawls did not ignore or overlook the problem of 
disability.  He explicitly assumed it away, along with all serious 
accidents and disease, by assuming that all members of society are able 
to be fully contributing participants over their entire lives.29  This move 
is a simplifying assumption, made so he could concentrate his analytical 
attention on the problems his account highlights.  In the wake of his 
book, other theorists of justice have relaxed this simplifying 
assumption.30 
B.  Already Available Theories of Justice Address the Issue 
This problem is one that is very plausibly treated by the prioritarian 
principle.  The plausibility of the prioritarian approach to the problem is 
 
 28. Id. at 293. 
 29. Rawls’s most explicit discussion of this aspect of A Theory of Justice occurs in 
his later book.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 183–85 (1993).  Rawls wrote: “I 
have assumed throughout, and shall continue to assume, that while citizens do not have 
equal capacities, they do have, at least to the essential minimum degree, the moral, 
intellectual, and physical capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating members of 
society over a complete life.”  Id. at 183. 
 30. For example, see SEN, supra note 13.  See also NORMAN DANIELS, JUST 
HEALTH CARE 1–56 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000). 
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interesting in its own right and indicates that prioritarianism itself merits 
serious scrutiny. 
Recall that the prioritarian view is that social arrangements should be 
set and actions chosen to maximize weighted well-being.  The lower an 
individual’s lifetime well-being, the greater the value of increasing it. 
Disability tends to lower well-being prospects.  Other things being 
equal, one has higher life prospects if one has normal eyesight than if 
one is blind.  So other things being equal, the prioritarian has a reason to 
channel resources toward the disabled, in so far as disability status 
correlates with low well-being. 
Disability sometimes has another effect.  Being disabled can reduce the 
amount of well-being gain that one is enabled to achieve by a given 
infusion of resources, compared to what an able person could get with the 
same resource infusion.  For example, if an individual is blind, deaf, 
legless, and in chronic pain, that person’s well-being may well be very 
low even if enormous resources are expended on him, and even though his 
well-being always increases a little with each increment of aid.  At some 
point, these two effects will balance, so that bringing it about that the 
conditions of his life improve further gains less weighted well-being than 
would using these same resources to bring about improvements in the 
conditions of people who are already relatively better off in well-being. 
Prioritarianism registers the common sense judgment that able people 
owe some moral consideration to the disabled, and have some significant 
responsibility for improving their lives.  But this responsibility is limited, 
because at some point the gains from further aid to the disabled are 
morally outweighed by the greater moral value that would accrue if the 
aid is channeled elsewhere.  The priority view clarifies the nature of this 
trade-off and uses a sensible yardstick for measuring gains and losses to 
people from alternate social arrangements. 
This sensible yardstick claim has been challenged.31  Consider Tiny 
Tim, the cheerful cripple in Charles Dickens’s story A Christmas Carol.  
He is immensely cheerful and is perhaps happier than the average 
person.  According to prioritarianism, the judgment that some special 
consideration is owed to the disabled depends on the factual claim that 
having a disability makes one worse off.  But, the argument goes, at this 
point prioritarianism diverges from common sense judgment.  The latter 
 
 31. See G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 917–
21 (1989). 
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holds that what we owe to the disabled does not vary with any estimate 
of their overall well-being prospects—a happy Tiny Tim is no less 
deserving of a motorized wheelchair. 
C.  In Reply 
The Tiny Tim example illustrates the importance of understanding 
well-being as access to the full range of genuinely important human 
goods and not merely as having subjectively satisfying mental states.  
Even a cheerful Tiny Tim, we think, suffers misfortune.  But it is not 
objectionable that the priority view holds that the special reason to aid a 
person that stems from the fact that she suffers a disability may be 
outweighed by other factors that render it the case that she is overall 
enjoying a good quality of life compared to others.  Moreover, we must 
be careful to distinguish judgments made at the level of ideal theory with 
full information and judgments about public policy here and now, that 
must be made with limited information in nonideal circumstances.  A 
law that provides for governmental assistance to the needy must identify 
the needy recipients of aid by markers that are reasonably easy to 
identify and verify, and costly to fake.  Hence a sensible law that was 
warranted by prioritarian principle would provide aid in some 
circumstances where an agent with full information would deny it and 
deny aid in some circumstances in which an agent with full information 
would provide it.  (So some Tiny Tims would merit aid by the terms of a 
sensible legal policy or social practice but not by the terms of ideal 
moral principle.) 
The authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice might 
object that this Essay’s discussion of what to do about people with 
disabilities makes exactly the error they are concerned to correct.32  They 
might argue that I have slipped into writing as though the problem was 
simply one of fairly dividing the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.  However, the morality of inclusion is focused on a prior 
and more fundamental issue—how to design the framework for social 
cooperation so that it is adequately inclusive. 
The objection misfires.  Fairly dividing the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation requires envisaging alternative schemes of cooperation 
that might produce greater benefits or a more fair division.  What the 
authors regard as the problem of inclusion is an aspect of the fair 
division problem, rather than an analytically distinct issue.  In given 
circumstances the priority view might require small adjustments at the 
 
 32. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 303 (one of several passages that 
suggest they would make this objection). 
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margins of the existing scheme of cooperation (for example, altering the 
eligibility requirements for food stamps), but in other circumstances it 
might require wholesale transformation (for example, moving from a 
socialist to a free market capitalist economy or the reverse). 
Moreover, there is something unsatisfactory about framing the issue as 
the extent to which we should widen the dominant scheme of 
cooperation.  This language tends to convey the impression that we face 
one large decision—the choice of a dominant scheme. But however 
exactly one demarcates the dominant framework from the rest, the fact is 
that the effects of the operation of the dominant framework can be 
modified by adjustment of nondominant aspects of the cooperative 
scheme.  The underlying issue is what adjustments to the status quo, 
large or small, can be made at what cost in order to achieve what level of 
gain for what number of individuals at what prior well-being level.  How 
does focusing on the dominant scheme of cooperation33 help determine 
what policy choices should be made? 
These decisions to include or exclude, whether made explicitly or by 
inattention, will typically be piecemeal.  One may decide that the benefit 
if any to severely retarded persons that would accrue to them from 
guaranteeing them the franchise and gearing political debate to their 
level of comprehension is outweighed by the resultant lowering of the 
expectable quality of democratic decisionmaking, so this form of 
inclusion should not be implemented.  Other forms of inclusion may be 
more cost-effective when judged by the proper moral standard.  For 
example, regulation and taxation of business firms to stimulate the 
provision of paid employment to severely retarded persons might prove 
to be a morally required form of inclusion according to prioritarian 
principle.  By contrast, some forms of severe mental illness that tend to 
make people disruptive in social settings requiring complex coordination 
of tasks, but do not make people less able than others, on the average, to 
vote wisely (should they choose to vote at all) might prompt the reverse 
judgments—inclusion of people with these forms of mental illness by 
way of extension of the political franchise but no special attempts to 
include them in the workplace. 
A careful reader might well complain that the argument that 
prioritarianism satisfactorily addresses the problem of inclusion is 
entirely unfounded.  Prioritarianism as characterized here is a family of 
 
 33. Id. at 288–91. 
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moral principles.  To determine a specific principle that would yield 
definite implications for policy, one would have to specify a particular 
weighting.  To what degree exactly does the lifetime level of well-being 
a person would have, absent some benefit, raise or lower the value of 
getting the benefit for that person?  I do not claim to know the answer.  
But then surely this Essay’s assertion that prioritarianism resolves the 
conflict of claims that generates the problem of inclusion is a sham. 
This objection has some force.  However, viewing the problem 
through a prioritarian lens sharpens our understanding.  The weighting 
problem that we must resolve to get determinate policy implications is 
exactly the problem we do need to solve to arrive at sound principle.  In 
particular, the prioritarian position is that the terms in which the interests 
at stake should be balanced should be cast in terms of people’s well-
being levels.  The right policy choice depends on its long term impact on 
the actual quality of people’s lives.  Finally, one can say something 
vague but nontrivial toward a solution of the weighting problem.  At one 
extreme, a prioritarianism that gives almost no extra weight to well-
being gains that accrue to those with low well-being collapses into a 
version of straightforward aggregate utilitarianism.  This position is too 
extreme.  At the other extreme, a prioritarianism that gives infinite extra 
weight to providing a benefit of any size to someone whose well-being 
level is just slightly lower than the well-being level of alternative 
recipients of the benefit collapses into leximin.  This position is too 
extreme.  One should espouse a “Goldilocks principle” that assigns a 
weighting in the middle range and splits the difference between these 
extremes. 
In an interesting discussion, the authors tentatively suggested a moral 
balancing of interests different from what the priority view as modified 
above recommends.34  They suggested that morality might require as a 
first priority, bringing as many individuals as possible to a threshold 
level of participation in the cooperative framework, a level that is good 
enough.  Above that level, the moral concern to promote inclusion 
legitimately has less weight, compared to the concern to make 
cooperative schemes maximally productive. 
The authors made this suggestion in an exploratory spirit without 
committing themselves to it.  It might still be worth noting that this 
suggestion is inadequate, and the inadequacy points toward the priority 
view.  First, one surely does not want to assign strict priority to boosting 
those who are below the threshold over bringing about benefit for those 
who are already above the threshold.  Some individuals might have traits 
that render boosting them to the threshold extremely costly.  Some 
 
 34. Id. at 301–02. 
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individuals will inevitably remain below threshold, but vast expenditures 
of resources would move them just slightly closer to it.  In some 
circumstances, very small expenditures of resources would provide 
great benefit for those already above threshold, and, in some cases, for 
those barely above threshold.  Whether one understands the authors as 
recommending (a) giving strict priority to bringing as many individuals 
as possible to the threshold, or rather (b) giving strict priority to bringing 
about gains for those who are below the threshold (whether or not they 
can be brought to it), the recommendation should be rejected, because 
for any individual, no matter how badly off she is, if the cost to other 
better-off people of bringing about a small benefit to her becomes larger 
and larger, at some point, the priority should switch to helping the 
others.  Second, one cannot identify nonarbitrarily a threshold level of 
participation in cooperative schemes, bringing people to which has 
special moral value.  There is no such threshold.  There is rather a 
continuum of well-being levels, from hell to heaven as it were, and for 
any individual, it is better to be closer to the heavenly end of the scale. 
V.  FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
In chapters 3 and 4, the authors considered how best to interpret the 
ideal of equality of opportunity, regarded as a fundamental justice norm 
that inter alia determines what we owe one another by way of medical 
care provision.35  The authors opted for a Rawlsian conception of 
equality of opportunity as modified by Norman Daniels’s suggestion that 
fundamental moral rights to medical care should be included within the 
requirements of Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity.36 The authors 
defended this Rawls-Daniels approach to equality of opportunity against 
more expansive and demanding conceptions and urged that it provides a 
sound framework for exploring the moral ramifications of new genetic 
technologies.37  To evaluate these claims, some stage setting is needed. 
The Rawlsian principle that the authors at least tentatively embraced 
holds that social and economic inequalities must be (a) attached to 
positions and offices open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and 
(b) to the maximal long run benefit of the least advantaged members of 
 
 35. Id. at 65–86, 108–49. 
 36. Id. at 109. 
 37. Id. at 108–49. 
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society.38  Fair equality of opportunity obtains when all persons with the 
same native talent and the same ambition have the same prospects for 
success in competitions for positions that yield above-average shares of 
social and economic goods.39  In this principle (a) has strict priority over 
(b), so that no inequalities are permitted, even if they would work to 
optimize the prospects of the least advantaged, unless the fair equality of 
opportunity norm is satisfied.40  In the application of this principle, 
social and economic benefits are measured in terms of primary social 
goods (other than basic constitutional liberties).41 
Norman Daniels proposed to include health care within the fair 
equality of opportunity principle.42  In any given arrangement of society, 
with fair equality of opportunity otherwise provided, the native traits of 
an individual afford her access to a certain share of the array of 
reasonable life plans people can choose in the society (including a 
certain level of expected success in competitions for positions of 
advantage).43  Ill health and the lingering effects of chronic and episodic 
disease and injury deprive an individual of her share of this normal 
opportunity range, to which she has an entitlement.44  Health care 
provision aims to restore individuals to their shares of the normal 
opportunity range so far as this is feasible.45  Fair equality of opportunity 
extended to include health care holds that this must be done as a matter 
of justice.  Extended fair equality of opportunity then, is not obtained 
unless persons with the same native talent and same ambition have the 
same prospects for competitive success, despite any differences among 
them in their health history and in their susceptibilities to injury and 
disease (within constraints of feasibility).46 
This position has its attractions, but its chief weakness is that it gives a 
special and arbitrary priority to making sure that all individuals with the 
same native talents have the same prospects for success in competitions 
for advantage, come what may.  The position need not suppose that 
talents are metaphysically set.  Whether a given trait an individual is 
born with counts as a talent or not depends on the contingencies of 
the given social and natural environment.  Suppose, however, that the 
meshing of individual traits and environment in a given society brings it 
about that one person is talented and susceptible to disease and another 
 
 38. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 266. 
 39. Id. at 63. 
 40. Id. at 266–67. 
 41. Id. at 78–81. 
 42. DANIELS, supra note 30, at 36–58. 
 43. Id. at 32–35. 
 44. Id. at 54. 
 45. Id. at 53. 
 46. Id. at 37–48. 
FINALARNESON.DOC 2/11/2020  1:24 PM 
[VOL. 39:  715, 2002]  New Genetic Technology 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 731 
is untalented and not susceptible to disease.  Why suppose that it is a 
special requirement of justice that the bad effects on the individual’s life 
of susceptibility to disease are to be blocked as far as is possible so that 
the talented individual enjoys the identical share of the normal range of 
opportunity that goes to all other equally talented and ambitious 
individuals?  The special entitlement linked to possession of native talent 
on this approach embeds a meritocratic element at the core of the 
principles of justice. 
This summary judgment might be resisted on the ground that fair 
equality of opportunity must be assessed as it interacts with the other 
principles in the Rawlsian system, and especially the difference 
principle.47  The competitions that assign positions of advantage are to 
be set so that they work to the long term maximal benefit of the least 
advantaged citizens.  Moreover, if fair equality of opportunity is not 
fulfilled, the response required by Rawlsian theory is enforcement of 
equal distribution of social and economic benefits, not class privileges 
for the talented.48 
But something is amiss.  One way to see this is to notice that fair 
equality of opportunity might be a strongly binding constraint on the 
pursuit of the amelioration of the lot of the least advantaged.  In 
situations where inequalities could be instituted that would violate fair 
equality of opportunity and work to the significant benefit of the least 
advantaged, doing this is forbidden by Rawlsian justice.49  This 
conclusion is counterintuitive unless fair equality of opportunity itself 
commands our strong allegiance.  The words “equality of opportunity” 
conjure images of denial of equal opportunity by horrible practices of 
arbitrary exclusion such as Jim Crow laws or a regime in which all good 
jobs are reserved for men only.  But the Rawlsian principle extends 
equality of opportunity requirements far beyond these types of cases, 
 
 47. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 127–28. 
 48. The claims in the two preceding sentences in the text are straightforward 
implications of Rawls’s second principle of justice, that includes the equality of fair 
opportunity and difference principle components, along with a priority rule linking them.  
See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 266–67. 
 49. According to Rawls, an inequality in social and economic benefits is 
permissible only if it is attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of 
equality of fair opportunity.  For example, if allowing employers to hire and fire at will 
increased economic production and hence (via redistributive taxation) the share of 
benefits going to the worst off, but resulted in discriminatory patterns of employment, 
Rawls’s principle with its priority rule would forbid this grant of discretion to employers.  
See id. 
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and the Daniels expansion of the principle extends them even further.  
Suppose a wealthy, charming, intelligent youth has a chronic mild disease 
condition that is very difficult and expensive to treat.  Contrary to 
extended fair equality of opportunity, justice does not require as a matter 
of special priority that health care resources be channeled to the well off 
but not healthy youth without regard for the cost of such provision on 
the well-being opportunities of the worst off. 
Several issues are joined here.  They need to be disentangled.  One 
issue is whether health care is morally special as compared to a wide 
range of social provisions that might improve the quality of people’s 
lives.  Another is whether social and economic justice requires equal 
provision of any sort, whether equal opportunity or equal something else.  
Yet another is whether the different elements in a theory of justice can 
plausibly be ordered by way of Rawls’s strict lexical priority relations.  
Finally, there is the issue of whether, at the level of fundamental moral 
theory, distributive justice should take resources  (in particular, primary 
social goods), or instead the quality of life that provision of resources 
affords, as the standard of interpersonal comparison.  These are large 
issues, which this brief Essay cannot settle. 
This Essay briefly indicates what is problematic about the Rawls-
Daniels resolution of these issues.  Consider again the extremely talented 
person, leading a great life, who falls victim to accident or disease.  We 
stipulate the person does not command a large share of material 
resources, primary social goods such as income and wealth.  She uses 
her talents informally, outside the market, a way that is congenial to her. 
Suppose resources are limited, and society can choose to cure this 
overall fortunate individual’s medical condition, restoring her to normal 
species functioning, or install a public park in a neighborhood where 
people who are in the pink of health but leading lives of very low quality 
reside.  What determines whether priority should attach to bringing 
about benefits for the sick but fortunate individual or for others depends 
on the overall lifetime well-being level each affected person would 
reach, absent our contemplated policy intervention.  In the example, 
contrary to the Rawls-Daniels theory, priority should go to helping the 
worse off, though what should be done depends also on the amount of 
benefit that the worse off and better off would gain from alternative 
policies.  Neither people’s resource shares nor an amalgam of resource 
shares plus health conditions registers what we must know in order to 
determine who is truly needy and deserving of extra aid.  Moreover, 
neither establishing equality of condition nor maximizing the resource 
level of the worst off subject to equal opportunity constraints, is what 
fundamentally matters from a moral standpoint.  In a nutshell, what 
matters morally is priority for the badly off, not equality or maximin.  
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The measure of how well off or badly off one is should be well-being, 
not resources (and not resources adjusted for health status either). 
In chapter 4 the authors presented an apparent counterexample to the 
Rawls-Daniels extended account of fair equality of opportunity as 
applied to health care provision.50  This account draws a sharp moral 
distinction between conditions of disease and disability that detract from 
the individual’s share of the normal opportunity range that is set by the 
individual’s native talent and conditions that are not health care 
problems in this sense but could be ameliorated by medical treatment.51  
The former conditions prima facie deprive the individual of fair equality 
of opportunity.  Justice requires that the conditions be ameliorated if that 
is medically feasible.  The latter conditions do not in this way trigger fair 
equality of opportunity requirements.  Hence, a child whose disease 
condition, if untreated, will lower her expected adult height is owed 
medical treatment according to the Rawls-Daniels approach, but a child 
whose normal genetic disposition gives her the identical expected adult 
height and could be ameliorated by medical treatment just as cost-
effectively is not owed medical treatment under the Rawls-Daniels 
approach. 
The weaknesses the counterexample exposes are debilitating.  What is 
special about health care needs is that bad health threatens well-being.  
But at the level of fundamental moral theory, nothing gives health care 
needs a moral priority over anything else that is needed for well-being.  
What we owe one another is a decent chance at living a good life, and 
anything and everything that improve the odds or boost the expected 
well-being that people can attain are morally on a par.  Saying this is, of 
course, compatible with choosing social and legal policy, which must be 
coarse grained,52 on the basis of distinctions that roughly track what 
ultimately matters from the moral standpoint. Again, for the prioritarian, 
the right coarse-grained distinctions are those that produce the morally 
best outcomes for people. 
 
 50. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 115–16. 
 51. Id. 
 52. A policy is coarse grained if it prescribes that actions should not vary in 
response to variations in some morally relevant feature of the situation in which action is 
to occur.  For example, a welfare state policy of aid to the needy is coarse grained if it 
provides that all people with demonstrated low income should get the same aid 
regardless of how they came to have low income.  A policy should be coarse grained if 
making the policy finer grained produces worse results as evaluated by fundamental 
moral theory. 
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The authors oddly introduced considerations of efficiency in support 
of the Rawls-Daniels theory of equality of opportunity.  They did so by 
contrasting this relatively restricted conception of equality of opportunity 
with other more expansive conceptions that do not take the natural 
distribution of native talent as a baseline, but rather require that all 
persons should have equal initial opportunity to achieve the good life. 
This is what the authors called the brute luck conception of equality of 
opportunity.53  Within this paradigm, opportunity is understood such that 
if one has an opportunity for X, then chooses X and tries to get it, one 
gets it.  These more expansive conceptions of equal opportunity require 
that all factors that affect a person’s prospects for the good life, should 
they choose seriously to pursue it, must be offset or adjusted so that no 
factors beyond the individual’s control give her lesser prospects than 
anyone else enjoys.  The authors sensibly responded that any such 
expansive conception of equal opportunity, if fully implemented, would 
be enormously expensive in terms of other values and might well leave 
everyone worse off than they would be if this expansive conception were 
not implemented.54 
But there are distinct questions here that need to be kept straight.  One 
question is how best to interpret the ideal of equality—either as equality 
of outcome or equality of opportunity.  A quite different question is what 
relative moral importance to assign to equality when it conflicts with 
other moral values.  The authors argued against the brute luck 
conception of equality of opportunity on the ground that it is implausible 
to suppose that this ideal of equality trumps all other moral values.  But 
it may well be the case that the best conception of equality should not 
trump all other moral values, so this consideration is misplaced if 
directed as an objection against any proposed interpretation of equality. 
Matters are yet more complex in ways that undermine the authors’ 
dismissal of the brute luck conception of distributive justice.  This 
conception, broadly understood, holds that what we owe one another by 
way of justice obligations is to prevent or alleviate misfortune, but in 
each case the extent of our obligation varies depending on the degree to 
which the misfortune we are considering is due to sheer brute luck or is 
mediated by the individual’s voluntary choice or negligence that might 
have prevented the condition.55  For example, we might owe more to 
Smith, who is badly off because a foreign invasion he could not have 
foreseen devastated his life, than to Jones, who is badly off because he 
 
 53. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 66–73. 
 54. The authors emphasized that principles of justice must integrate concerns for 
equality, liberty, and efficiency rather than go whole hog for equality.  Id. at 127–28; see 
also id. at 132–33. 
 55. DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 73. 
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failed to utilize attractive opportunities and instead chose to dabble in 
recreational drugs that proved destructive, even if the same infusion of 
aid would do just as much for Jones as for Smith and have no further 
consequences.  It is obvious that the idea that the distinction between 
brute luck and option luck should matter for distributive justice—the 
idea that what we owe to needy individuals depends on their degree of 
personal responsibility for their plight—is entirely independent of the 
idea that distributive justice bids us to pursue equality or some other 
goal.  This Essay posits that the distinction between brute luck and option 
luck should register significantly in the formulation of fundamental 
moral principles.  This view might be right or wrong.  It is not impugned 
by the claim that the goal of equalizing people’s condition does not 
trump all other moral values, nor even by the claim that this sort of 
equalizing has no moral value per se at all. 
The authors linked this disagreement between expansive and restricted 
conceptions of equal opportunity with an issue concerning the scope of 
justice obligations.56  Does distributive justice, in its role of catering to 
the disadvantaged, require compensation for natural disadvantage, such 
as being born with low intelligence, or require only compensation or 
elimination of socially constructed disadvantage?  The Rawlsian response, 
toward which the authors incline, is complex.  On the one hand, equal 
opportunity in the fair equality version requires only that those with the 
same talents and ambitions should have the same competitive prospects.  
On the other hand, the social mechanisms that confer unequal shares of 
primary social goods other than basic liberty must be set so that the long 
term primary goods expectations of the least favored social group are 
maximized.  The authors added the interesting observation that the line 
between what is naturally given and what is socially constructed shifts 
with new genetic technologies, because technologies give us the power 
to determine with increasing precision exactly what genetic 
predisposition to traits any newborn individual will possess.57 
The comparison of restricted and expansive conceptions of equality of 
opportunity is itself too restricted to facilitate clear judgments about the 
major issues raised by the Rawls-Daniels approach to equal opportunity.  
The discussion in this Part attempts to explain how this is so. 
As already noted, the comparison of two rival interpretations of equal 
 
 56. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 75–77, 109, 126–41. 
 57. Id. at 82–84. 
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opportunity leaves undiscussed the issue of whether any sort of equal 
distribution of opportunity is a fundamental justice requirement.  On the 
prioritarian view, everyone’s having the same is not intrinsically morally 
desirable.58 
Once the scope issue is separated from the equality issue, there is 
much to be said for wide scope as interpreted by prioritarianism.  On this 
view, our obligation to assist an individual depends on what well-being 
gain we can achieve for her at what cost (measured by the standard of 
prioritarian values) and on what her well-being expectation is prior to 
receipt of this benefit.  If an individual is badly off and can be aided at 
reasonable cost, whether her disadvantage is socially or naturally caused 
does not affect impediments to well-being and, in this respect, are 








 58. See PARFIT, supra note 18, at 19–20. 
